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INTRODUCTION
An en bane Federal Circuit recently confirmed that § 112 of the Patent
Act,' as properly interpreted, includes a written description requirement that
is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. 2 The written de-
scription and enablement doctrines both encourage applicants to fully dis-
close their inventions, but the doctrines respectively focus on proof that the
t This Essay was previously published in the Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy on
May 16, 2010, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 382 (2010), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/
lawreview/colloquy/2010/13/LRCoIl201On13Crouch.pdf.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law, crouchdd@missouri.edu. Au-
thor of Patent Law Blog (Patently-O), http://www.patentlyo.com. I want to thank the Colloquy editors
for their excellent and timely editorial suggestions.
1 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006).
2 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Federal Circuit's pro-
nouncements on patent law are especially important because that court holds exclusive jurisdiction over
all appeals of final decisions for cases that arise under the U.S. patent laws. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vor-
nado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829-30 (2002).
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patentee (1) has possession of the invention' and (2) has enabled others to
make and use the invention.' The en banc challenger argued instead that the
patent statute spells out a unified requirement of a written description that
enables and that the separate written description requirement should be
eliminated.'
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is the executive
branch agency tasked with the responsibility of examining patent applica-
tions to determine whether patent rights should issue.' Once a patent issues,
the constitutionally guaranteed exclusive rights' can be enforced in federal
courts.' Although the USPTO has no direct role in the infringement dispute
between the patentee Ariad' and the accused infringer Eli Lilly,"o the gov-
ernment submitted an amicus curiae brief indicating its continued support
for the written description requirement as a tool that the USPTO uses to
eliminate claims during the patent examination process." The government
argued in its brief that a separate written description requirement is "neces-
sary to permit USPTO to perform its basic examination function."" When
pressed during oral arguments, however, the government could not point to
any direct evidence supporting its contention."
3 Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (asking whether the application
"reasonably convey[s] to one of skill in the art that the inventor possessed the [claimed] subject matter at
the time the [patent] application was filed").
4 AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1243-44 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that the original speci-
fication of a patent must enable one of skill in the art to make and use the invention).
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, AriadPharms., 598 F.3d 1336 (No. 2008-1248).
6 See generally JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 45-58 (3d ed. 2009) (providing an overview of
the patent examination process).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries").
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .").
Ariad's U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 entitled "Nuclear Factors Associated with Transcriptional Reg-
ulation" includes over 200 claims that broadly cover methods for reducing the activity of the naturally
occurring Nuclear Factor Kappa B (NF-icB) protein. The patent is jointly owned by Harvard College,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Whitehead Institute, and exclusively licensed by Ariad.
U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 (filed June 5, 1995).
10 Eli Lilly has a history of involvement in disputes over the written description requirement. It was
the 1997 Federal Circuit decision of Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d
1559, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997), that sparked what many have seen as a heightened written description re-
quirement for biotechnology-related inventions.
I Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Respondent,
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1248) [hereinafter
Brief for the United States].
12 Id. at 20.
1 See Oral Argument at 23:00-29:30, AriadPharms., 598 F.3d 1336 (No. 2008-1248) (argued Dec.
7, 2009), available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov (search for appeal number 2008-1248; then
click audio link for 2008-1248-2).
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This Essay presents the results of a retrospective empirical study of the
role of the written description requirement in patent office examination
practice. It is narrowly focused on rebutting the USPTO's claim that the
separate written description requirement serves an important role in the pat-
ent prosecution process. To the contrary, my results support the conclusion
that it is indeed "exceedingly rare that the patent office hangs its case on
written description."l
For the study, I analyzed 2858 Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ence (BPAI) patent opinions decided between January and June of 2009.
Written description issues were decided in 123 (4.3%) of the decisions in
my sample. Perhaps surprisingly, I found that none of the outcomes of
those decisions would have been impacted by a legal change that entirely
eliminated the written description requirement of § 112, so long as the
USPTO would still be allowed to reject claims based on the addition of
"new matter" (perhaps under 35 U.S.C. § 132)."1 A rule change that also
prohibited the USPTO from making new matter rejections would alter the
result in only twenty of the 2858 cases-about 1% of the cases in my sam-
ple." These results correspond to the outcomes found by Professor Holman
in his 2007 article, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Compre-
hensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the Courts
and PTO." In that article, Holman identified nine examples where original
claims were rejected for lacking written description." However, Holman
wrote that each of those rejected claims was, or "could have easily been,"
held invalid for lacking enablement.19
In Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit maintained
the written description doctrine as a separate and distinct requirement.2 0
The en banc panel based its decision on the text of the Patent Act and its ac-
companying jurisprudential history, rather than on the policy grounds that
the doctrine plays an important role in policing patent applicant behavior.2'
The dissenting-in-part opinion by Judge Linn, joined by Judge Rader, as
well as the concurring opinion of Judge Gajarsa, cite a working version of
this Essay in reaching their conclusions that the separate written description
14 Id. at 24:08 (Michel, C.J.) (as transcribed by the author).
is This very small number of positive observations suggests that the distribution is well modeled
with the Poisson distribution. Using a Poisson distribution, the 95% confidence interval for expected
proportion of affected cases is 0.0 %-0. 6 %.
16 The empirical study has a 95% confidence interval of 0.5%-2.6%.
17 Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assess-
ment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. Sl. & TECH. 1, 70
(2007).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 71.
20 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
21 Id. at 1343-45.
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requirement is not justified on policy grounds.22 As shown in this Essay,
the empirical data confirms the court's rejection of the doctrine's impor-
tance.
This Essay is narrowly written to provide a new set of empirical results
that inform the debate over the importance of the written description in the
context of patent prosecution. The strong conclusion is that, in the context
of patent applications appealed to the BPAI, the impact of the separate writ-
ten description requirement is negligible apart from its role in policing the
addition of new matter. I posit that this study of BPAI decisions also serves
as a good proxy for the relative proportion of non-appealed cases where the
USPTO depends upon the written description requirement to limit claim
scope. The analysis does, however, have limits. Perhaps most importantly,
I only consider past decisions within a six-month window and thus do not
consider the future effect of a change in the written description requirement
on both applicant and patent office behavior.
These results are important as a direct rebuttal to the USPTO claims of
doctrinal importance and as a means to lessen fears that elimination of a
separate written description requirement would have a drastic impact on the
patent prosecution practice.23 More generally, the results prompt a consid-
eration of the ongoing role of niche patent law doctrines.
Part I of this Essay offers a brief discussion of § 112's requirements for
written description. Part II examines the Ariad challenge to the written de-
scription requirement presented on appeal. Part III explores the USPTO's
claimed need for a strong and separate written description requirement to
aid in the patent examination process. Part IV presents the empirical study
and its results. Part V provides a brief set of final remarks and conclusions.
I. THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 112
The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 focuses attention on the amount
of disclosure that a patent applicant must provide in its specification:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his inven-
21tion.
22 Id. at 1372 (Linn & Rader, JJ., dissenting in part); id. at 1360 (Gajarsa, J., concurring); see also
Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
23 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 429-30 (2000) (refusing to overrule Miranda
based largely on the "persuasive force" of stare decisis).
24 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006).
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From this paragraph, courts have derived three separate but overlap-
ping doctrines: written description, enablement, and best mode. 25  These
doctrines have been amply described by others, and as such, I provide only
as much background here as is necessary for this Essay.26
As it stands, the written description doctrine requires that the patent
specification "reasonably convey to one of skill in the art that the inventor
possessed the [claimed] subject matter at the time the parent application
was filed." 27  Patent applicants often add or amend claims during prosecu-
tion, and the primary historical function of the written description doctrine
has been to police the addition of "new matter" into the patent claims.28
Section 132 of the Patent Act also provides a prohibition against "intro-
duc[ing] new matter into the disclosure of the invention." 29  Because the
claims of a patent are considered part of the disclosure,30 the plain language
of § 132 could also apply to limit changes in claim scope. However, in an
effort to avoid confusion between these two statutory provisions, the prede-
cessor to the Federal Circuit held that the written description requirement of
§ 112 served as "[t]he proper basis for rejection of a claim amended to re-
cite elements thought to be without support in the original disclosure" and
relegated § 132 to the role of policing improper amendments to the specifi-
cation."
25 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123 (2006). This Essay
focuses on the enablement and written description doctrines, without regard to the best mode doctrine.
26 See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7 (2009); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Dis-
closure, 94 IOWA L. REv. 539 (2009); Holbrook, supra note 25; Holman, supra note 17; Sean A. Pass-
ino, Amy M. Rocklin & Stephen B. Maebius, Written Description Traps for Antibody Claims, 86 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 317 (2004); Guang Ming Whitley, A Patent Doctrine Without Bounds: The
"Extended" Written Description Requirement, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 617 (2004).
27 Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (considering whether later-claimed
subject matter had been properly disclosed in the parent application).
28 See id.; see also In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212 (C.C.P.A. 1981); In re Smith, 458 F.2d 1389,
1395 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (a subgenus is not necessarily described by a genus encompassing it and a species
upon which it reads); In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (subgenus range was not supported
by generic disclosure and specific example within the subgenus range); Craig Allen Nard & John F.
Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1663 (2007) (noting
that the written description requirement "has traditionally applied to amendments to claims made during
the prosecution of an application").
29 35 U.S.C. § 132.
30 In re Gardner, 480 F.2d 879, 879 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
31 In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d at 1214. This Essay focuses on the role of the written description in
patent office practice. However, it is important to note the open question of whether the new matter re-
striction of § 132 properly serves as a basis in federal court for an invalidity defense to charges of patent
infringement. See Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 543 F.3d 657, 659 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (finding that improper revival is not an available defense); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1305-07 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Lourie, J., concurring) (denying motion for en banc re-
hearing and noting that the listing of statutory defenses to patent infringement found in 35 U.S.C. § 282
does not include the new matter doctrine of § 132); Dennis Crouch, Erroneous Revival by PTO Is Not a
Cognizable Defense in an Infringement Action, PATENTLY-O, Sept. 22, 2008,
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2008/09/erroneous-reviv.html.
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Originally filed patent claims are typically self-describing. Patent
claims ordinarily exhibit the requisite evidence of "possession" by simply
spelling out the metes and bounds of the patent right. However, several re-
cent Federal Circuit opinions have held that originally filed patent claims
also lack sufficient written description if possession of the invention is not
demonstrated.32 This newer wing of the written description requirement is
often termed Lilly Written Description (LWD) in homage to the 1997 Eli
Lilly decision"3 that expanded the doctrine.34 Original-claim failings may be
found where the invention is claimed and described in a functional form
without identifying underlying structures of operation. Likewise, broad
original claims have been held invalid for failing the written description re-
quirement when the specification did not include detail sufficient to "con-
vince a person of skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention.""
For instance, the 2005 LizardTech case involved a patent claim directed to a
method of compressing digital images using seamless discrete wave trans-
formation (DWT).36 Although the specification only described one method
for creating a seamless DWT, the claim was not limited to that particular
method.37 The appellate panel in LizardTech held the claim invalid for fail-
ing the written description requirement, finding that the specification did
not provide sufficient evidence that the patentee invented the generic me-
thod."
As is common, the LizardTech decision included a parallel finding that
the generic claim was not enabled." The enablement doctrine requires that
the original specification of a patent enable one of skill in the art to make
32 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir.
1997); see generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2163 (8th ed. July 2008) ("[A] lack of adequate written description may arise even for an
original claim when an aspect of the claimed invention has not been described with sufficient particular-
ity such that one skilled in the art would recognize that the applicant had possession of the claimed in-
vention."); Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 615 (1998) (describing the development of the
written description requirement). It is important to remember that the originally filed claims are them-
selves part of the original specification. N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 938 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
3 Regents, 119 F.3d 1559.
34 Holman, supra note 17, at 4; see Mueller, supra note 32, at 633 (arguing that written description
as applied to original claims is an inappropriate "super-enablement" requirement).
35 LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
36 Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1342-43.
38 Id at 1345-46.
3 Id at 1345. See also Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(holding that the enablement question was moot because claims were rendered invalid for failing the
written description requirement); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1172 (2002); Holman, supra note 17, at 78.
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and use the invention." Although typically overlapping, the written de-
scription and enablement requirements are distinct.4 1
II. THE ARIAD CHALLENGE TO THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT
A. Questions on Appeal
In Ariad, an en banc Federal Circuit considered the continued role of
the written description requirement as a doctrine separate and distinct from
enablement. The questions presented read as follows:
1. Whether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a written description re-
quirement separate from an enablement requirement?
2. If a separate written description requirement is set forth in the statute, what
is the scope and purpose of the requirement?4 2
These legal questions had been brewing for years.43
B. Background of the Dispute
The inventors of Ariad's asserted U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 (the '516
Patent) discovered a transcription factor protein that they named Nuclear
Factor Kappa B (NF-icB)." The presence of NF-icB within a cell causes the
cell to produce cytokines that are important for a cell's immune response.45
The '516 Patent does not claim invention of the NF-icB protein itself, but
rather the method of reducing a cell's response to external influences by re-
ducing the NF-icB binding.46
After an infringement trial, a Massachusetts jury found that two of
Lilly's products infringed Ariad's asserted '516 Patent.47 The jury also re-
jected Lilly's arguments that the patent was anticipated, that the patent
lacked an enabling disclosure, and that the patent failed the written descrip-
tion requirement.4t Although Lilly appealed each of these issues, the Fed-
eral Circuit panel focused on the written description requirement, finding
4o 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1327 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 2008); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
41 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 921 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that
"[a]lthough there is often significant overlap," the requirements are distinct).
42 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc).
43 See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1303-04 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying
en banc rehearing); LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1374-76 (denying en banc rehearing); Enzo Biochem, Inc.
v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970-75 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (denying en banc rehearing); Holman, supra
note 17.
44 AriadPharms., 560 F.3d at 1369.
45 Id. at 1370.
46 Id
47 Id
48 Id at 1370-71.
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Ariad's claims invalid for failing to provide a written description of the in-
vention.49
The heart of the Ariad written description problem centers around the
fact that the '516 Patent "discloses no working or even prophetic examples
of methods that reduce NF-icB activity, and no completed syntheses of any
of the molecules prophesized to be capable of reducing NF-icB activity.""o
According to the Ariad court, "The state of the art at the time of filing was
primitive and uncertain, leaving Ariad with an insufficient supply of prior
art knowledge with which to fill the gaping holes in its disclosure."'
The appellate panel refused to consider the parallel questions of en-
ablement and anticipation, finding those issues moot based on the written
description invalidity holding.52 Judge Linn wrote a separate concurring
opinion in which he reiterated his belief that the court's "engrafting of a
separate written description requirement onto section 112, paragraph I is
misguided."53
The Federal Circuit subsequently granted Ariad's motion for an en
banc rehearing of the written description issue.54 Over twenty-five amici
filed briefs, including the U.S. government." At the December 7, 2009 oral
arguments, the U.S. government was also granted time to argue its posi-
tion. 6
III. THE USPTO's CLAIM OF A NEED FOR THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
REQUIREMENT
In its amicus curiae brief, the U.S. government indicated its continued
support for a separate written description requirement as a tool that the
agency uses to eliminate claims during patent prosecutions." The govern-
ment made its position clear: A separate written description requirement is
"essential to the operation of the patent system";" it plays an "indispensable
49 Id at 1373-77 (holding that the verdict lacked substantial evidence to support its conclusion).
The court also rejected Lilly's inequitable conduct challenge. Id at 1377-80.
50 Id. at 1376.
51Id.
52 Id. at 1380 ("Because we hold that claims 80, 95, 144, and 145 of the '516 patent are invalid for
lack of written description, we need not address infringement or the other validity issues on appeal.").
53 Id (Linn, J., concurring); see also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303,
1325-27 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 987-89 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Linn, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
54 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
55 See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that, of
the twenty-five amicus briefs received by the court, seventeen supported Lilly, one supported Ariad, and
seven supported neither party) .
56 Oral Argumentsupra note 13.
5 Brief for the United States, supra note 11.
58 Id. at 19.
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role in the administration of the patent system";5 1 it is "fundamental to the
operation of the patent system";"o and it is "necessary for USPTO to per-
form its examination function."' These conclusions are grounded in the
USPTO's "practical experience" in "appl[ying] the requirements of Section
112, T 1 to more than 400,000 patent applications each year."62 Although
the government did not provide any actual examples, it did explain two
situations where the written description requirement becomes important.63
First, the government argued that for claims written in purely functional
terms, the USPTO is better able to judge written description than enable-
ment:
Though such [functional] claims may be enabled, USPTO is not an experimen-
tal laboratory: it lacks both the facilities and the statutory mandate to deter-
mine, through empirical testing, whether any of millions of prior art inventions
may have exhibited the recited function. By insisting that each applicant pro-
vide a full and exact "written description of the invention" as part of the speci-
fication, Congress protected the ability of USPTO to perform its essential
function of distinguishing patentable inventions from the prior art. Indeed, this
is one of the original and enduring purposes of the written description re-
quirement: to "distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before
known and used.""
The government also argued that the written description requirement is
necessary to police priority claims and ensure that patent applicants do not
improperly add new matter during the prosecution process:
The written-description requirement permits USPTO and the courts to resolve
priority disputes in an expedient and judicially reviewable fashion by compar-
ing the specifications of the patents or applications in question. Similarly,
"[e]very patent system must have some provision to prevent applicants from
using the amendment process to update their disclosures (claims or specifica-
tions) during their pendency before the patent office." Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing); see 35 U.S.C. § 132. "Adequate description of the
59 Id.
60 Id. at 20.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 19.
63 Id. at 23-25. Similar arguments are raised in the USPTO's Guidelines for Examination of Patent
Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. § 112, } 1, "Written Description" Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099
(Jan. 5, 2001). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Circuit Bar Association in Support of Appellant
at 22-23, AriadPharms., 598 F.3d 1336 (No. 2008-1248) ("A separate written description requirement
is an important tool to permit the Patent Office and courts to enforce this foundational principle."); Brief
of the Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant Supporting
Reversal at 22, AriadPharns., 598 F.3d 1336 (No. 2008-1248) (noting that a purpose of the written de-
scription requirement is to "Prevent Applicants . . . from Obtaining Claims to Inventions That They Did
Not Invent").
Brief for the United States, supra note 11, at 21, (quoting Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat.
109, 110 (repealed 1793)).
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invention guards against the inventor's overreaching by insisting that he re-
count his invention in such detail that his future claims can be determined to be
encompassed within his original creation." Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935
F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).65
During oral arguments, the court pressed the government attorney,
Mark Freeman, for specific evidence supporting the contention that the sep-
arate written description requirement serves a practical purpose. As in its
brief, the government did not point to any evidence supporting the conclu-
sory statements. The following colloquy at oral arguments between Chief
Judge Michel and Mr. Freeman emphasized this point:
Chief Judge Michel: Why does the patent office care? I mean, how many ap-
plications that can't be rejected on other statutory grounds will fail only if we
[retain the current written description requirement]? . . . I'm asking about im-
pact ....
Mr. Freeman on Behalf of the Government: I don't know an absolute number,
your Honor, but I think that number must be high ....
Chief Judge Michel: I can't remember ever seeing a patent office rejection that
was based only on the failure of written description. I'm not saying there
aren't any, but the flow of cases that come through this court at three or four
hundred a year, it's exceedingly rare that the patent office hangs its case on
written description. I can't remember a single case.
Mr. Freeman: Your Honor, I don't have a single case in mind ....
Chief Judge Michel: [I]t seems like the practical impact is miniscule, negligi-
ble.
Mr. Freeman: Your Honor, with all respect, one cannot assume away four
hundred thousand applications where the written description doctrine comes
into play in a great many of them.66
This Essay is directed to the particular questions of Chief Judge Mi-
chel: How often does the separate written description requirement actually
make a difference in patent cases? As revealed in Part IV, Chief Judge Mi-
chel's notional recollections from the bench are far more accurate than the
government's contentions.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT IN
PATENT PROSECUTION
This study analyzes the comparative impact that a change in the written
description requirement would have had on ex parte BPAI appeals decided
in the first half of 2009. I posit two potential doctrinal changes and their
impact on USPTO practice: (1) elimination of a separate written description
requirement, including elimination of the USPTO's ability to reject claims
65 Id. at 22.
6 Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 22:40-24:30, (excerpt reproduced as transcribed by the author).
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that include "new matter";" and (2) elimination of a separate written de-
scription requirement, with the exception that the USPTO may still reject
claims for the inclusion of new matter.8
To be clear, Ariad has not argued for complete elimination of the writ-
ten description requirement. Rather, the petitioner's position is that written
description and enablement form a combined resulting doctrine that would
have more power than the current enablement doctrine. 69  For this study,
however, I did not consider a strengthened enablement doctrine. Thus, my
results overstate the impact of eliminating a separate written description re-
quirement, since a strengthened enablement doctrine would limit that im-
pact.
A. Study Design
I broadly searched 2,858 ex parte BPAI decisions that were decided
January through June 2009 and identified 365 decisions that mention "writ-
ten description.""o Each identified decision was reviewed by hand to deter-
mine the particular type of written description rejection at issue and to
determine whether a doctrinal change in the written description requirement
would have impacted the outcome of the appeal."
I expect this potential outcome (eliminating the USPTO's ability to issue new matter rejections)
to be unlikely for several reasons. Most notably, elimination of the separate written description re-
quirement as a mechanism for policing new matter would abrogate In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212,
1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981), and, at least, open the door for the USPTO to reject claims under the new matter
prohibitions of 35 U.S.C. § 132. The Rasmussen opinion was premised on the notion that § 112 includes
a written description requirement. See Rasmussen, 650 F.2d at 1214. Elimination of the written descrip-
tion requirement would likewise eliminate the justification for precedential value of Rasmussen. More
recent Federal Circuit case law has already strained the Rasmussen holding by considering claims to be
properly rejected under § 132. In Moba, B. V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2003), for instance, the Federal Circuit explained that "a rejection of an amended claim under § 132
is equivalent to a rejection under § 112, first paragraph." (internal quotation marks omitted). Neverthe-
less, because this point is apparently in serious dispute, I consider it as a potential doctrinal change.
68 Other potential outcomes, such as a strengthening of the written description requirement, were
excluded.
69 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 5.
70 These represented all of the ex parte BPAI decisions available via Westlaw as of February 16,
2010.
71 See infra Table 1. To be clear, I only considered cases where claims were rejected under the
written description requirement. There are two other contexts where written description issues regularly
arise. First, written description is applied in the prior art context to limit the prior art that is asserted.
Second, an applicant's attempt to assert rights back to a parent filing, for instance under 35 U.S.C.
§ 120, is limited by the written description of the parent filing.
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TABLE 1: DOCTRINAL CHANGE CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY.
Potential Doctrinal Change
Doctrinal Change 1: elimination
of a separate written description
requirement, including elimina-
tion of the USPTO's ability to
reject claims that include "new
matter."
Doctrinal Change 2: elimination
of a separate written description
requirement except that the
USPTO may still reject claims
for the inclusion of new matter.
Classification Methodology
Decisions were classified as being impacted
by Doctrinal Change 1 if the decision in-
cluded a written description requirement is-
sue that was sustained on appeal for at least
one claim, and no other rejections of that
claim were sustained on appeal.72
Decisions were classified as being impacted
by Doctrinal Change 2 if the decision in-
cluded a written description requirement is-
sue that was sustained on appeal for at least
one original claim, and no other rejections of
that claim were sustained on appeal.
B. Study Outcomes
Written description issues were decided in 123 (4.3%) of the 2858 de-
cisions.74 A written description requirement rejection was sustained in 50
(1.7%) of the decisions" but was outcome-determinative in only 23 (0.8%)
of the decisions. 76  All 23 of these outcome-determinative decisions in-
volved the rejection of claims that had been added or amended during
prosecution and addressed the concern that the added limitations were not
properly described in the original specification. More pointedly, none of
the outcomes of those decisions would have been impacted by a hypotheti-
cal change that eliminated the written description requirement so long as
new matter rejections were still allowed under the same standard available
today. These impacts of a doctrinal change in the written description re-
quirement are shown in Table 2, with a 95% confidence interval (CI) of the
expected proportion of affected cases."
72 I coded new reasons for rejection raised by the BPAl as "sustained on appeal."
For this study, a claim is considered "original" if the claim was included in the original nonprovi-
sional application filing. When the appeal involves a continuation application, a claim is "original" only
if the language was found in the original nonprovisional parent application. A patent applicant is al-
lowed to amend claims during prosecution. However, written description requirement rejections of
amended claims are typically treated under the new matter wing of the doctrine. See supra text accom-
panying notes 28-31.
74 As a point of reference, a recent study found that 90% of appeals included at least one obvious-
ness issue that was decided on appeal. Dennis D. Crouch, Understanding the Role of the Board of Pat-
ent Appeals: Ex Parte Rejection Rates on Appeal 10 (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 2009-16, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1423922.
A rejection was considered "sustained" if a rejection of at least one claim was sustained.
76 The written description issue was judged "outcome-determinative" if the decision included a
written description requirement issue that was sustained on appeal for at least one claim and if no other
rejections of that claim were sustained on appeal.
7 The outcomes are modeled with the Poisson distribution.
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TABLE 2: RETROSPECTIVE IMPACT OF DOCTRINAL CHANGE ON 2009 BPAI DECISIONS.
Number of
Affected 95%
Potential Doctrinal Change Cases CI
Doctrinal Change 1: elimination of a separate written de- 23 (0.8%) 0.5% -
scription requirement including elimination of the 1.2%
USPTO's ability to reject claims that include new matter.
Doctrinal Change 2: elimination of a separate written de- 0 (0.00%) 0.0% -
scription requirement except that the USPTO may still re- 0.3%
ject claims for the inclusion of new matter.
Twelve of the BPAI decisions did involve written description require-
ment rejections based on originally filed claim language that could be clas-
sified as LWD rejections. However, the written description requirement
was not outcome-determinative in any of these cases because the exam-
iner's rejection was either reversed (nine of the cases) or else the claims
were also rejected under another statutory doctrine (three of the cases). The
three decisions where the LWD written description rejection was affirmed
all involved inventions related to chemistry" or biotechnology." This is the
same situation discussed in the Federal Circuit case of In re Kubin.so Ta-
ble 3 shows written description issues grouped by the USPTO technology
center of origin. As shown in the table, the chemistry and biotechnology-
related technology centers are associated with a greater prevalence of writ-
ten description issues." However, even in those areas, the outcome-
determinative written description issues were always associated with the
new matter wing of the requirement.
7 Ex parte Harboe, No. 2008-5837, 2009 WL 1683026 (B.P.A.I. May 19, 2009) (reducing the glu-
coamylase activity in a milk-clotting composition); Exparte Hottovy, No. 2008-4938, 2009 WL 798882
(B.P.A.I. Mar. 24, 2009) (polymerization of olefin monomers in a liquid diluent).
Ex parte Carney, No. 2008-4806, 2009 WL 64628 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 12, 2009) (stimulating cartilage
growth by administering an agonist of an activated thrombin receptor). In his 2007 study, Holman
found nine BPAI decisions affirming LWD rejections-all in the area of biotechnology. Holman, supra
note 17, at 70.
80 561 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming obviousness rejection and not deciding question
of written description); see also Ex parte Kubin, No. 2007-0819, 2007 WL 2070495 (B.P.A.I. May 31,
2007) (affirming obviousness and written description rejection but reversing enablement rejection).
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1700 Chemical and 571 29 (5.1%) 10 (1.8%) 0 (0.0%)
Materials
Engineering




2600 Communications 249 4(1.6%) 0 (0.0%) 0(0.0%)
2800 Semiconductors, 333 8 (2.4%) 1 (0.3%) 0 (0.0%)
Electrical and
Optical Systems




3700 Mechanical 456 21(4.6%) 1 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%)
Engineering,
Manufacturing
3900 Reexaminations 39 4(10.3%) 2(5.1%) 0(0.0%)
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
None of the 2858 BPAI decisions that I analyzed sustained an out-
come-determinative written description requirement rejection of originally
filed claims. This result indicates that Chief Judge Michel's perspective is
82 The total number of BPAI decisions categorized in this table is slightly less than the 2858 re-
viewed decisions because some of the decisions did not indicate a technology center in the header in-
formation. If all of the decisions had been properly categorized, the reported percentages would drop
slightly.
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correct that-apart from new matter and late-claiming issues-the USPTO
actually relies on the written description requirement to support examiner
rejection in only a miniscule number of cases (at least at the level of ap-
peals).84 Although not an exact reflection, the BPAI appeals numbers likely
serve as a good proxy for the proportion of non-appealed prosecution files
where the USPTO depends upon the written description requirement to
limit claim scope."
This study comes with several important caveats. It does not answer
any questions about the proper role of the written description requirement
during litigation. Likewise, this study is not intended to either indict or
support the potential use of the written description requirement during pat-
ent examination. Rather, the study is directed only toward rebutting the
USPTO's statements that the written description requirement is necessary
for the agency to perform its examination function. Based on the results
presented here, it is safe to treat the USPTO's statements of the doctrine's
importance as incorrect. The Ariad court was correct in its rejection of this
argument.
84 See supra text accompanying note 67 for a discussion of why new matter claim rejections will
still be viable even if the separate written description requirement is eliminated.
85 Although not conclusive, several factors suggest that written description rejections may be ap-
pealed at a greater rate than ordinary obviousness rejections. First, an accurate practitioner perception
that BPAI appeals of written description requirement rejections have a higher-than-average reversal rate
could lead to a larger proportion of those types of rejections appealed. Crouch, supra note 74. Second,
the recent tumultuous nature of the written description requirement and the associated uncertainty adds
to the likelihood that a rejection on that issue would be appealed. Finally, written description rejec-
tions-especially those relating to LWD-tend to arise from biotechnology- and chemical-related patent
applications. Because patents in those areas tend to be more valuable than average, we would expect a
higher rate of appeal.
As a cross-check, I examined the file histories of a small group of randomly selected and publicly
available patent applications with serial numbers 11/000,000-11/999,999. For each application, I
looked at the most recent final office action (if any) to determine the reasons for rejection. Only one of
the twenty final office actions in my sample included a written description rejection, and that rejection
was based on subject matter that had changed due to an amendment during prosecution.
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